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This research examined disadvantageous inequality aversion in 4- and 6-year-old children.
Using the resource allocation paradigm, we explored how inequality aversion was inﬂu-
enced by whether a cost was associated with the equitable choice. We also investigated
whether preferences for equality differed depending on whether the inequitable choice
presented a small or large discrepancy between the payoff of the participant and their
partner.The results demonstrated that cost plays a large role in decision-making, as children
preferred equality more when there was no cost associated with it compared to when
there was a cost. Interestingly, the effect of cost also affected discrepancy, with children
more likely to choose equality when the discrepancy was large as opposed to small, in
cost trials but not in no cost trials. Finally, the effect of discrepancy also interacted with
age, with older children being more sensitive to the discrepancy between themselves and
their partner.Together, these results suggest that children’s behavior is not indiscriminately
guided by a generalized aversion to inequality or established fairness norms. Alternate
motives for inequality aversion are discussed.
Keywords: social development, inequality aversion, resource allocation
INTRODUCTION
A concern for fairness is important in motivating human
cooperation and prosocial behavior. By understanding how this
concern emerges in development, wemay be better able to support
and encourage the development of important social behaviors.
Children appear to be sensitive to fairness from a very young age;
for example, children as young as 15 months of age will look
longer at an unfair distribution of reward than a fair distribution
(Sommerville et al., 2012). Young children also demonstrate a sen-
sitivity to inequality in resource distribution situations in which
they are one of the recipients. It is now well documented that chil-
dren begin to share resources early in the preschool period (e.g.,
Damon, 1975; Rheingold et al., 1976; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998).
When given the opportunity to share resources with others to
establish an equal distribution, childrenwill often do so evenwhen
a material cost to themselves is required (Thompson et al., 1997;
Fehr et al., 2008; Moore, 2009). By 3-years of age, children will
also object when a peer or partner receives more than them
(LoBue et al., 2011). However, whether children are motivated
by fairness concerns in such situations remains unclear. Alter-
natively, children may be motivated by prosociality in situations
where they can forgo a reward in order to deliver a beneﬁt to
a partner or by envy resulting from social comparison in sit-
uations where they can act to prevent another receiving more
than themselves (Shaw and Olson, 2012). The present study
examines possiblemotivations underlying children’s resource allo-
cation, particularly in situations in which they are potentially
at a disadvantage compared to a partner. Before elaborating
on the particular approach used in the current study, we ﬁrst
brieﬂy describe relatedwork on children’s decision-making in such
situations.
Situations in which children are asked to react to an inequitable
distribution of resources that favors the partner are said to involve
“disadvantageous inequality” (DI). In contrast to advantageous
inequality (AI) situations in which an inequitable distribution
favors the child, DI situations have received less attention in
the literature. However DI situations offer an interesting case
for comparing differing motivations underlying fairness. When
children show preference for an equal distribution of resources
rather than allowing a partner to have more, they may be moti-
vated by a desire for fairness but alternatively they may be
motivated by envy resulting from social comparison (Shaw and
Olson, 2012). While assessing fairness requires a comparison in
the sense that one must compare one’s own resources to the
partner’s, in the current study, as in Shaw and Olson’s (2012),
“social comparison” refers to the desire to not have less than a
partner.
In order to study inequality aversion in a way that elimi-
nated social comparison as a potential motive, Shaw and Olson
(2012) used a third party design in which 3- to 8-year-old
children decided how to allocate resources to two unknownpartic-
ipants. They found that even younger participants would discard
an extra resource when asked to split an uneven amount of
resources between two recipients. These results revealed a prin-
ciple of inequality aversion governing children’s decisions in third
party situations, but cannot inform us about how such con-
cerns may operate when children’s own interests are at stake.
We know that children as young as 3–4 years of age understand
fairness norms, and will report that resources should be split
equally, however, it is not until age 7–8 that their sharing behav-
ior aligns with the norms of fairness they endorse (Smith et al.,
2013).
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Research on DI aversion when children’s own interests are
at stake has largely been carried out to examine the origin and
development of DI aversion in children and much of it has
compared children’s reactions to DI and AI situations (e.g., Fehr
et al., 2008; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; LoBue et al., 2011). In
general, this work shows that aversion to these two forms of
inequality develops along distinct developmental trajectories, with
children demonstrating a dislike for inequality that disadvan-
tages themselves several years before they exhibit aversion toward
inequality that favors themselves. For example, LoBue et al. (2011)
found that children as young as 3 years of age would object
when an experimenter distributed resources in a way that dis-
advantaged themselves in comparison to a partner. However,
children were less likely to object to unequal distributions that
placed them at an advantage in comparison to their partner. This
ﬁnding suggests that children’s motives in DI situations are at
least in part motivated by envy resulting from negative social
comparison.
In the study by LoBue et al. (2011), children responded to unfair
resource distributions imposed by an adult. However, when chil-
dren have the opportunity to decide themselves how resources are
distributed across self and a partner, there is also evidence that
children will avoid DI. In perhaps the ﬁrst experiment on DI situ-
ations in children, Fehr et al. (2008) used a forced choice resource
allocation task to introduce an “envy” decision in which 3- to
8-year-olds chose between an equal distribution of reward (one
candy for both self and partner) and an unequal distribution of
reward that disadvantaged themselves (one candy for self and two
for the partner). Equitable choices in this DI trial were compared
with two AI trials, in which equality came with either a cost or no
cost. Thoughpreferences for equality differed across trials, anover-
all increase in equitable decisions with age was observed, and the
authors cast this development in terms of a principle of inequality
aversion general to both AI and DI situations. There was, how-
ever, no direct evidence that the same concerns were motivating
decision-making in the different trials types. The increase in equi-
table choices observed in the DI choices is particularly ambiguous
because the level of preference for the equal choice at the younger
age was no different from chance. Because the DI choice did not
involve a cost, it is entirely possible that the younger children were
only paying attention to their own reward and were unaffected by
the disadvantageous comparison between their reward and those
of their partner. Without a condition in which avoiding DI comes
at a cost, it is not possible to determine whether these younger
children really are avoiding inequality, or what, if any, motive they
have for doing so.
Subsequent work has shown that a preference for equality
sometimes presents itself even when there is a cost associated
with removing the comparative disadvantage. Blake andMcAuliffe
(2011) presented 4- to 8-year-olds with an unequal number of
candies for themselves and a partner, and asked them if they
would like to accept or reject the offer (in which case neither
party received anything). In DI trials children were offered one
candy for themselves, and four for their partner, while in AI
trials children were offered four candies for self and one for
partner. While children did not show inequality aversion to AI
until 8 years of age, children across all age groups commonly
rejected DI offers. As in the case of LoBue et al. (2011) discussed
earlier, the different developmental patterns suggest that avoid-
ance of AI and DI are differentially motivated at least in young
children (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011). The results also suggest
that when the other stands to get a much larger reward than
the self, children are strongly motivated to reject the resource
allocation.
The two studies just described remain the only two that have
directly examined children’s self-involved DI decisions in resource
allocation contexts across different age groups. However, com-
parison across the two studies is difﬁcult because they differed in
two key aspects. Fehr et al. (2008) presented DI choices for which
there was no cost to making the equitable choice (the children
received the same reward either way) and the potential discrep-
ancy between self and partner was relatively small (one vs. two). In
contrast, Blake and McAuliffe (2011) presented choices for which
there was a cost to avoiding DI (both participants lost everything),
and the potential inequality was relatively large (one vs. four).
It is conceivable that both of these variables have an impact on
children’s decisions in DI contexts. Younger children may have a
tendency to focus on their own reward exclusively, and therefore a
cost choice could lead to a lower level of inequality aversion com-
pared to a no cost choice, forwhich childrenmay choose essentially
randomly. The size of the discrepancy between self and other may
also have an effect in that the larger discrepancy, the greater the
potential for a negative social comparison and resultant feelings of
envy. So, if envy is motivating decisions in DI situations, children
may avoid inequality to a greater extent when the discrepancy is
large compared to when it is small.
To generate a clearer picture of how young children’s decisions
inDI situations aremotivated,we presented 4- and 6-year-old chil-
dren with a series of decisions, each involving a choice between an
equal distribution of resources and an unequal distribution that
favored the partner.We varied both the cost of making an equitable
decision and the size of the discrepancy between the reward for self
and other in the DI case. First, we compared the type of DI trial
introduced by Fehr et al. (2008) in which there was no cost to the
participant for either choice, with a costly trial type in which the
child would have to give up their own resource to avoid inequality
(cf. Blake and McAuliffe, 2011). Although how cost inﬂuences DI
has not been systematically explored, cost has been shown to inﬂu-
ence behavior in other social contexts. In situations of AI, children
demonstrate weaker preferences for equality when it comes with a
cost (Thompson et al., 1997; Fehr et al., 2008; Moore, 2009). Chil-
dren also judge others less harshly for not helping someone in
need when there are high costs associated with helping, compared
to when costs are low (Sierksma et al., 2014). Given these estab-
lished cost effects across other social domains, it was hypothesized
that cost would also inﬂuence decision-making in situations of DI.
Speciﬁcally, it was expected that children would show a stronger
preference for equality when there was no cost associated with it,
partially because those children who only paid attention to their
own payoff would bemore likely to choose the equal option.While
the absence of a cost effect would provide support for inequality
aversion motives, an effect of cost would suggest children’s deci-
sion making is inﬂuenced by what is in their own best interest, as
opposed to fairness norms.
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Second, we compared children’s decisions in DI situations
involving twodifferent discrepancies between the participant’s and
the other recipient’s resources in the unequal option. In half the
trials the discrepancy was small (one for self; two for partner) and
in half the trials the discrepancy was larger (one for self; ﬁve for
partner). The reasoning here was that if children are primarily
concerned with maintaining equality, in accordance with fairness
norms, then there shouldbe little ornodifferencebetween egalitar-
ian choices in these two trial types. However, if they are responding
more to the envy engendered by social comparison between self
and other, then the larger the discrepancy, the more they may be
inclined to reject it. Therefore, in line with the idea that children’s
decisions in DI situations may be motivated by social comparison
and envy concerns, we predicted more egalitarian choices would
be made in large discrepancy trials compared to small discrepancy
trials.
To summarize, combining these two variables yielded four
types of trials: no cost with a small discrepancy (1,1 vs. 1,2);
no cost with a large discrepancy (1,1 vs. 1,5); cost with a
small discrepancy (0,0 vs. 1,2); and cost with a large discrep-
ancy (0,0 vs. 1,5). Children of 4 and 6 years of age were
tested because evidence of increasing inequality aversion in the
envy trial type has been observed in this age range (e.g., Fehr
et al., 2008), but previous research has not adequately explored
motives underlying decision-making in DI situations in children
of these ages. Given that inequality aversion has been observed
to increase with age in multiple resource allocation situations
(e.g, Fehr et al., 2008; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw and
Olson, 2012) it was predicated that older children would make
more egalitarian decisions compared to younger children. In view
of the limited background literature on DI, no speciﬁc predic-
tions were made regarding interactions between age, cost and
discrepancy.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-two typically developing children drawn from a predomi-
nately white middle-class neighborhood in a small Canadian city
participated in this study, which was approved by the University’s
research ethics board. Participants were recruited from a database,
as well as a variety of community classes and events. Two par-
ticipants were excluded due to incomplete participation leaving a
sample of 40 children. The 4-year-old group (10males, 10 females)
had a mean age of 52 months, 6 days (ranging from 42 months,
17 days to 57 months, 2 days). The 6-year-old group (8 females,
12 males), had a mean age of 75 months, 29 days (ranging from
68 months, 6 days to 82 months, 24 days).
PROCEDURE
All testing took place in the lab, and began once parental con-
sent and participant assent was obtained. Following the approach
introduced by Moore (2009), children were asked to think of,
and name a friend they enjoyed playing with. Children were then
asked to draw themselves and their friend from memory on indi-
vidual 4′′ by 6′′ inch blank cards. Before testing started children
were asked to identify their drawings, and were corrected if either
drawing was misremembered.
FIGURE 1 | Method of trial presentation showing the small
discrepancy, no cost trial type.
The researcher then faced the child and said, “We’re going to
play a choosing game. In this game, sometimes you might choose
stickers for you and (friend’s name) and sometimes you might
choose not to take any stickers. The stickers you choose for your-
self will go here, and the stickers you choose for (friend’s name) will
go here.”
Brightly colored stickers portraying popular television char-
acters that children found attractive, and appealing, were used
as the resource. A variety of different stickers was used with
each participant to ensure that the stickers remained salient and
attractive reward throughout the duration of the task. Children
were given a sticker book to place stickers they chose for them-
selves, and stickers chosen for their friend were placed in a
paper bag.
Before the test trials began, each child participated in one prac-
tice trial (choosing between one or two stickers for themselves)
to familiarize them with the format of the game. Responses were
recorded but not analyzed. There were four trial types and chil-
dren participated in three trials of each, for a total of 12 test trials.
Trials were presented in three blocks. Each block contained one
of each of the four different trials types. The order of the trial
types was varied within block, and the order of the blocks was
varied across participants to ensure no order effects contributed
to the ﬁndings. In each trial the picture of the participant and their
partner were placed on a piece of paper, and the two alternative
distributions were laid out below each picture, and divided by a
line (see Figure 1). Children were told, “Here you are and here is
(partner’s name).”
In each trial children were asked “Would you like to choose (n)
sticker(s) for yourself, and (n) for (friend’s name), or would you like
to choose (n) sticker(s) for yourself and (n) for (friend’s name)?” In
cost trials the choices were (0,0 vs. 1,2) in SD trials, and (0,0 vs.
1,5) in LD trials. In no cost trials the choices were (1,1 vs. 1,2)
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in SD trials, and (1,1, vs. 1,5) in LD trials. Participation for each
child lasted approximately 15min. Each session for which parental
consent to videotape was obtained was recorded for veriﬁcation
and coding purposes.
RESULTS
Children received one point for each egalitarian choice made (0,0
in cost trials and 1,1 in no cost trials), therefore receiving an over-
all score ranging from “0” to “3” for each trial type. Descriptive
statistics can be seen in Figure 2.
A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with
cost (cost, no cost) and discrepancy (SD, LD) as within sub-
ject factors, and age as a between subjects factor was performed
with the number of egalitarian choices as the dependent vari-
able. Between subjects, no signiﬁcant main effect of age was
observed, F(1,38) = 2.410, p = 0.129, η2p = 0.060. There was
a signiﬁcant main effect of cost, F(1,38) = 37.272, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.495, with more egalitarian decisions overall in no cost
trials (M = 3.33, SD = 1.64) compared to cost trials (M = 1.6,
SD = 2.01). There was no signiﬁcant interaction between cost and
age, F(1,38) = 0.196, p = 0.661, η2p = 0.005.
Although there was no signiﬁcant main effect of discrepancy,
F(1,38) = 2.018, p = 0.164, η2p = 0.050, and no signiﬁ-
cant three-way interaction between cost, discrepancy, and age,
F(1,38)= 0.400,p= 0.531,η2p = 0.010, two signiﬁcant interactions
involving discrepancy emerged. There were signiﬁcant interac-
tions between cost and discrepancy, F(1,38) = 5.778, p = 0.021,
η2p = 0.132, and between discrepancy and age, F(1,38) = 6.317,
p = 0.016, η2p = 0.143. These interactions were explored using
follow-up paired samples t-tests.
To follow up the interaction of cost and discrepancy, paired
t-tests showed that for cost trials children were more likely to
choose the egalitarian option when the discrepancy was large
(M = 1.0, SD= 1.13) thanwhen it was small (M = 0.6, SD= 0.98),
t(39) = −3.766, p = 0.001, but there was no difference between
the large (M = 1.63, SD = 1.03) and small (M = 1.7, SD = 1.01)
discrepancy for no cost trials, t(39)= 0.386, p= 0.701. In line with
themain effect of cost, children preferred equalitymore in no cost,
FIGURE 2 | Average egalitarian decisions (with standard error bars),
made by 4 and 6-year-old children in no cost and cost trials with small
and large discrepancies.
compared to cost trials in both small discrepancy, t(39) = –6.169,
p< 0.001, and large discrepancy trials, t(39) = −3.838, p< 0.001.
To examine the interaction involving age, the discrepancy
effect was examined for each age. It was found that the younger
(4-year-old) group showed no signiﬁcant effect of discrepancy,
t(19) = 0.925, p = 0.367, choosing the egalitarian option with
equal frequency whether the discrepancy was small (M = 2.2,
SD = 1.88) or large (M = 1.95, SD = 1.99). In contrast,
there was a signiﬁcant effect of discrepancy for the 6-year-olds,
t(19) = −2.438, p = 0.025, who chose the egalitarian option
more often when the discrepancy was large (M = 3.3, SD = 1.59)
compared to when it was small (M = 2.4, SD = 1.43).
Independent samples t-tests were run comparing 4-year-olds,
and 6-year-olds preferences in small, and large discrepancy trials.
While no differences between 4 and 6-year-olds were observed in
small discrepancy trials, t(38) = −0.379, p = 0.707, a signiﬁcant
differencewas observed in large discrepancy trials, t(38)=−2.371,
p = 0.023, with 6-year-olds choosing the equitable option more
often than 4-year-olds.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to explore how cost, discrep-
ancy, and age inﬂuenced young children’s decision-making in
DI situations, and to gain insight as to whether inequality aver-
sion or social comparison was motivating their behavior. Four-
and 6-year-old children were presented with resource allocation
choices in which one option delivered a greater beneﬁt to a friend,
and the other option was egalitarian. Across trials, egalitarian
choices entailed either a cost to the children’s own payoff, or no
cost. Trials also differed in terms of the discrepancy between the
resources available to self and other in the inequitable option,
yielding four distinct trial types; small discrepancy no cost tri-
als (1,1 vs. 1,2), large discrepancy no cost trials (1,1 vs. 1,5),
small discrepancy cost trials (0,0 vs. 1,2), and large discrepancy
cost trials (0,0 vs. 1,5). We expected that children would prefer
equality more when there was no cost associated with it, and that
older children would demonstrate a stronger aversion to inequal-
ity. It was proposed that if a generalized aversion to inequality
or fairness norms motivated decision-making, discrepancy would
not inﬂuence preferences for equality. However, if social com-
parison was inﬂuencing decision-making, children would show a
stronger preference for equality in LD trials compared to SD trials.
The ﬁndings demonstrated that both cost and discrepancy inﬂu-
enced children’s decisions. Therefore there does not appear to be
a simple or undifferentiated aversion to inequality operating in
these children. Here we discuss the key results in more detail, and
offer an account of the development of inequality aversion in DI
situations.
The results demonstrated that as hypothesized, children pre-
ferred equality more in no cost trials compared to cost trials; more
often choosing to prevent their partner from receiving a larger
reward when they were not required to sacriﬁce their own reward
to do so. This ﬁnding was consistent in both SD and LD trials, and
suggests that an important determinant of children’s decisions in
DI situations is whether a sacriﬁce is needed to achieve equality.
Like Fehr et al. (2008), we found that when there was no cost to the
egalitarian choice children chose this option over 50% of the time,
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and there was no strong difference between 4- and 6-year-olds to
act in this way. However, we found that when therewas a cost to the
egalitarian choice, and children had to sacriﬁce their resources, this
option was chosen much less frequently. Equality alone is there-
fore not the issue for these children; if equality comes at a cost it
will be largely forgone.
Nevertheless, our results do not suggest that children are com-
pletely unwilling to pay a cost to avoid DI. Whereas no overall
effect of discrepancy was observed, the effect of cost was inﬂu-
enced by the size of the discrepancy between the resources for the
child and their friend. Discrepancy did not inﬂuence decision-
making in no cost trials, however in costly trials children were
more likely to choose the egalitarian option when the discrep-
ancy was large compared to when it was small. This suggests
that in cost trials, social comparison was inﬂuencing decision-
making. Although Blake and McAuliffe (2011) did not explore
different discrepancies, our observation in large discrepancy cost
trials is consistent with their claim that 4–8 year-olds will sac-
riﬁce resources to prevent DI in which the other received four
times as many resources. Our results extend theirs in showing
that the size of the discrepancy makes a difference to children’s
tendency to pay the cost of preventing DI – children are more
likely to pay to avoid a large discrepancy, compared to a small
discrepancy. However, a single motivation based on social com-
parison cannot explain preferences for equality across all decisions
as there was no overall effect of discrepancy and in particular
no effect of discrepancy in no cost trials. Interestingly, research
suggests that when costs are low children perceive prosociality
as morally obligated, while in costly situations they may take
other factors into consideration (Sierksma et al., 2014). Therefore,
it could be that when there is no cost associated with equal-
ity choosing the equitable decision is an easy or even default
decision regardless of discrepancy. However, when a cost is asso-
ciated with equality children may be more sensitive to other
considerations such as the comparison between themselves and
their partner making a larger discrepancy more likely to moti-
vate a sacriﬁce. This could explain why a discrepancy effect was
observed in cost trials, but no overall effect of discrepancy was
observed.
Finally, although no overall age effect was observed, the
interaction between age and discrepancy provided evidence of a
developmental change in the conditions underwhich children seek
to prevent DI. It was argued that an increase in equitable decisions
corresponding with a larger discrepancy would provide support
for social comparisonmotives. An effect of discrepancywas indeed
observed but only for the older children. The 4-year-old children’s
preferences for equality did not differ depending on whether the
discrepancy between their own resources and their partner’s was
small or large. This pattern of behavior is entirely consistent with a
simpler account of their decision-making: younger children were
only paying attention to their own payoff, and ignoring the pay-
off for their partner. Thus, in no cost trials where both options
resulted in one sticker for the self, 4-year-olds chose each option
in about half the trials no matter what the reward conferred to
the other was. In cost trials where one option resulted in a smaller
reward, they made the more rewarding choice on the large major-
ity of trials, again regardless of the other’s payoff. Therefore, it is
likely that social comparison and envy played little or no role for
these children.
The 6-year-olds showed a different pattern of choices. They
were signiﬁcantly more likely than younger children to avoid DI
in the large discrepancy trials. Clearly they were more reluctant
than the younger children to let their friend have many more
resources than them, although they showed similar equanimity
to the younger children when the discrepancy between self and
friend was small. The older children therefore, were displaying
an aversion to the large discrepancy between own and other’s
resources, but because this aversion did not extend similarly to
the small discrepancy trials it appeared not to reﬂect a general
inequality aversion or fairness norm. Therefore, it seems that
for older children the large discrepancy led to a more negative
social comparison, and subsequently increased associated feelings
of envy.
Age related changes have previously been documented in DI
resource allocation contexts (Fehr et al., 2008; Blake andMcAuliffe,
2011; Shaw and Olson, 2012). However, earlier studies have not
systematically manipulated different aspects of the DI decisions. If
we are correct that different processes are underlying the decisions
at different ages in the current experiment, then this would explain
why, with different variables manipulated, we did not observe an
overall main effect of age. The number of equitable choices made
in some trial types may not have differed across age groups, but
it is possible that the processes underlying these choices differed
from those underlying other trial types. For example, the fact that
no overall age effect was observed could be partly due to the robust
cost effect that was consistent across both age groups. As evidence
of a more generalized aversion to inequality has been observed in
older children’s decision making (e.g., Blake and McAuliffe, 2011;
Shaw and Olson, 2012) it could be the case that social comparison
continues to play a role in making fairness evaluations, but chil-
dren become better able to overcome being inﬂuenced by negative
feelings with age.
One limitation of the current study is that a variety of differ-
ent stickers was used for each child and there was no pretest to
determine how much each child liked the various stickers. This
approach was taken to ensure that the stickers remained novel and
attractive over the course of the testing. However, it is possible
that the children may have found some stickers more attractive
than others, and this variability might have inﬂuenced the results,
although not in a systematic way. It should also be noted that
the inferences from the current study are limited in that the chil-
dren made their choices with a friend as the recipient, and these
results may not generalize to other partners outside of the context
of a friendship. It is possible that using friends as partners could
have produced more variability in terms of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the children and their partners than would have
been observed had we used anonymous or unknown partners. As
friends have been shown to elicit more generous behavior (e.g.,
Moore, 2009) it is possible that with a different partner less proso-
ciality would have been observed. Future research would beneﬁt
from exploring how preferences for equality in situations of DI
differ depending on whether a partner is known or unknown, or
a friend or non-friend (cf. Moore, 2009, for AI situations). Future
research should also further investigate factors that may inﬂuence
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preferences for equality in DI situations, and the motivations
behind such preferences. Exploring how discrepancy inﬂuences
decision-making in older age groups, as well as the inclusion of
additional measures (for example, asking children to explain the
reasoning behind their decisions) could help shed more light on
how motivations underlying decision-making change throughout
development.
In summary, we found no evidence of generalized inequality
aversion in 4- and 6-year-olds’ decisions in DI situations. Most
obviously, cost and no cost choices elicited different levels of egal-
itarian choices, with children preferring equality more when there
was no cost associated with it. In cost trials discrepancy also played
a role, as children were more likely to sacriﬁce their own resources
to prevent their partner from receiving many more stickers than
them, as opposed to just onemore. Further, the ﬁnding that 6-year-
olds choose the equitable optionmore in LD trials compared to the
4-year-olds suggests that children at this age may be particularly
sensitive to social comparison, and their desire for equality may
be more inﬂuenced by social comparison, as opposed to a more
generalized aversion to inequality. Taken together, our ﬁndings
suggest that between 4 and 6 years children become more attuned
to the social comparison between self and other when allocating
resources in potentially DI situations.Whereas 4-year-olds appear
to want to maintain a degree of equality between self and other,
they are not willing to pay for it. This pattern can be characterized
perhaps as a weak inequality aversion in that equality is preferred
when nothing is at stake personally (cf, Shaw and Olson, 2012).
By 6 years, children are sensitive to the social comparison such
that a desire for equality is increased in accordance with possi-
ble size of the negative comparison and even if there is a cost.
Interestingly, this age difference is inconsistent with an increas-
ing adherence with age to a social norm of fairness, as the older
children showed even less “normative” behavior than the younger
children. So, although children do seem to reach a point at about
8 years where their resource allocation decisions are organized in
relation to a fairness norm (Fehr et al., 2008; Blake and McAuliffe,
2011; Shaw andOlson, 2012), it appears they ﬁrst undergo a devel-
opmental shift that makes them more prone to social comparison
and envy. It is even possible that this shift is a necessary stage in
the development of more normative behavior. Social comparison
may set up the motivational conditions for fairness, and while DI
situations may elicit envy, AI situations may elicit social welfare
concerns such as altruism (Shaw and Olson, 2012). The resolution
of these incompatible experiences resulting from inequality situ-
ations may come, with appropriate cultural support, through an
adherence to a more general norm of equality.
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